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This is the report of the sixth session of the LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in 
Europe, which took place on Thursday 25 February, from 16.30-19.00h.
The hearing drew together a number of politicians, academics, practitioners and activists 
to discuss the question of the implications of Brexit for fundamental rights protection in 
the UK. Dominic Grieve QC and Marina Wheeler QC presented opening remarks on the 
British Bill of Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights respectively, and a very  
rich discussion ensued. Participants presented perspectives on and analyses of the state  
and fate of fundamental rights protection in the UK, spanning the matters of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, British 
relations with the Strasbourg Court and the British Bill of Rights. 
The report seeks to convey the breadth and depth of the very balanced debate that took 
place at this session. I would like to express my gratitude to the participants for their 
expert contributions as presented during the session itself and by way of additional papers. 
Many thanks are also due to Marion Osborne and David Spence for their excellent support 
and assistance in the organisation of the hearing. Any remaining errors in this report are 
my sole responsibility.
Dr Jo Murkens
Department of Law, LSE.
   Foreword
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1. Introduction
The subject of the sixth hearing of the LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe 
related to the implications of a possible Brexit for fundamental rights protection in the UK. 
Currently, fundamental rights in the UK are protected by three interlinked regimes: EU law 
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; the European Convention on Human Rights, 
whose effectiveness is enhanced by the Human Rights Act 1998; and domestic rights 
protection. The hearing drew together politicians, academics, practitioners and activists 
to discuss the state and fate of fundamental rights under these regimes in the light of the 
broader ongoing debate as to the UK’s continuing membership of the European Union. 
The panel discussion of the question ‘What would Brexit mean for the protection of 
fundamental rights in the UK?’ was sub-divided into four key topics: the role and nature  
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Section 1); the European Convention  
on Human Rights and British relations with the Strasbourg Court (Section 2); the  
question of the British Bill of Rights (Section 3); and the UK narratives and choice of 
reference points (Section 4).
2.   Summary
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The conclusions reached during this 
hearing were as follows: 
•  The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
has become a prominent instrument. In 
the event of Brexit, the Charter would 
cease to apply, but it is likely to carry 
residual effects in domestic law. 
•  The prisoner voting issue, which 
has acquired political salience and 
commanded media attention, has 
put a strain both on British relations 
with the European Court of Human 
Rights and on the reputation of the 
UK as an upholder and promoter of 
fundamental rights. This, in turn, 
carries implications for the protection 
of fundamental rights in Europe and at 
the international level more generally, 
because the UK holds significant 
influence in this sphere.
•  There is an important debate to be had 
about the British Bill of Rights in this 
context, and about whether it would 
entail a reduced level of fundamental 
rights protection in the UK. As it stands, 
the indications indeed are that it would 
amount to an ‘ECHR-minus’.
•  It is arguable that a British Bill of Rights 
would give rise to a sense of ownership. 
However, no coherent set of ‘British 
values’ exists that could inform a Bill  
of Rights. This would need to be 
addressed before such a Bill would  
work in practice.
•  The ongoing discussion over 
the British Bill of Rights and the 
impending referendum on continued 
EU membership both stem from an 
attitude that favours the repatriation 
of laws and rights. Participants were 
divided in their views on the nature and 
implications of this attitude but it was 
agreed that the central question here is 
that of the location of reference points.
•  Whilst Brexit would reduce the level of 
fundamental rights protection in the 
UK, the implications of a possible Brexit 
in this sphere would also be largely 
dependent on a number of variables, 
namely as to what would happen to 
the EUCFR in relation to domestic law, 
what would happen in relation to 
the ECHR and to British relations with 
the Strasbourg Court more generally, 
and what would happen to the British 
Bill of Rights and the commitment of 
the Conservative government to the 
realisation of this.
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3.   The role and nature of the EU Charter  
of Fundamental Rights
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(EUCFR) was formally incorporated into 
EU law by the Lisbon Treaty, and it applies 
to the EU institutions and to the Member 
States when they are implementing, 
derogating from, or acting in the scope  
of EU law. It sets out a detailed catalogue 
of rights, including not only civil and 
political rights, but also economic and 
social rights. In practice, however, these 
two ‘generations’ of rights are not 
accorded equal effect within the vision  
of rights set out by the EUCFR, for the 
Charter distinguishes ‘rights’ (which are 
fully effective) and ‘principles’ (which are 
not). And, as Catherine Barnard pointed 
out, economic and social rights are  
mostly ‘principles’. 
There was a general consensus among 
participants that the Charter has become 
a prominent instrument. Relatedly, the 
contribution of this instrument to the 
areas of data protection, workers’ rights 
and women’s rights was noted. But beyond 
this basic position as to the prominent 
role of the EUCFR, there was notably less 
agreement. Two points of disagreement 
surfaced in particular: one as to the 
necessity of the Charter and the other as 
to what would happen to it in relation to 
domestic law in the event of Brexit. 
Marina Wheeler opened the debate on 
the necessity of the Charter, arguing that 
“the Charter is a human rights instrument 
too far”. Her thesis was based upon 
three propositions. First, the Charter is 
unnecessary. The European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) already controls 
state conduct, and would be an adequate 
instrument of holding EU institutions 
to account also, along with the general 
principles of EU law. Second, the Charter 
lacks democratic legitimacy in the UK. 
Although it was aimed at reaffirming 
rights, it has arguably gone further and 
created new rights. The UK never intended 
it to operate as a set of standards against 
which domestic legislation could be 
struck down. It follows, finally, that the 
Charter “is a recipe for incoherence”. 
It makes no sense as a parallel body of 
rights alongside the ECHR, and, moreover, 
erodes national sovereignty because of 
the impact of Charter cases on domestic 
law by virtue of the EU law supremacy 
doctrine. The “proper role” of the Charter, 
Wheeler argued, is that of “a guiding 
set of principles for the institutions, not 
something that creates justiciable rights”.
These concerns were shared and developed 
by others on the panel. Lee Rotherham 
noted that these are also pertinent 
issues when it comes to the ECHR, which 
also poses particular challenges for 
accountability and democracy. Michael 
Pinto-Duschinsky meanwhile picked up the 
point about the nature and power of the 
rights set out in the Charter itself, arguing 
that this instrument (and the Court of 
Justice of the EU with it) is both more 
broad and more powerful than the ECHR, 
and that, moreover, it gives rise to an 
overly-complicated three-limbed system of 
fundamental rights protection. It would be 
simpler, he suggested, to have – via Brexit 
– the ECHR regime and domestic rights 
protection alone.
7LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe |
For others, however, it is precisely the 
breadth of the Charter and the range of 
rights it includes that constitutes its greatest 
strength. Geoffrey Robertson spoke of 
the value, in particular, of the right to 
dignity in Article 1, which has been used 
in litigation before the Court of Justice.1 
The Charter differs from the ECHR in this 
respect, because dignity is not set out as an 
express right in itself in the ECHR, featuring 
only in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights as an underlying 
principle and value of the Convention 
more generally. On a similar note, Jackie 
Jones argued that as the European Court of 
Human Rights has taken a fairly restrictive 
interpretation of Article 12 of the ECHR 
(the right to marry and found a family), a 
right to same-sex marriage is more likely 
to emerge via the Charter than under the 
Convention. The Charter, Jones argued, is a 
twenty-first century instrument which sets 
forth an updated vision of rights, and this 
has been especially important in promoting 
LGBT rights, the rights of the child, and 
women’s rights. To this Adam Wagner 
added the contribution of the Charter and 
EU law more generally to the protection 
of workers’ rights. He suggested that EU 
law has likely contributed to a “more 
worker-focused” type of labour right in 
the UK. Brexit and a possible decoupling of 
domestic law from the underlying Directives 
that have given rise to these rights would 
cause these to “probably fluctuate”.
The question as to what would happen 
to the Charter and the rights contained 
therein in the event of Brexit was the 
subject of much debate. Whilst some 
participants, including Dominic Grieve 
and Marina Wheeler, took the position 
that upon Brexit, the Charter would 
cease to apply, Catherine Barnard argued 
that in practice the position would be 
more complicated. This would be so, she 
suggested, because there would likely be 
“residual effects” of EU human rights law.
Barnard suggested that there are three 
possibilities for dealing with existing 
domestic legislation already implementing 
EU law: to leave domestic law as it is, with 
parliamentary intervention on a case-by-
case basis and selected repeal of unwanted 
legislation; a constitutional convention to 
review implementing legislation and to 
selectively repeal unwanted legislation; or, 
a repeal of all EU-origin legislation and, 
possibly, its replacement with UK-origin 
equivalents. Barnard argued that the third 
option was not feasible, and that the more 
likely scenario would be a combination 
of the first two possibilities – that is, a 
mechanism by which legislation is reviewed 
selectively and repealed selectively. 
But the issue, she indicated, is that 
domestic statutory instruments already 
implementing EU law have already been 
interpreted in the light of EU fundamental 
rights law,2 and here the residual effects 
of this body of law would consequently 
be seen. Moreover, even in the case of the 
European Economic Area states, which are 
not bound by the EUCFR, EU fundamental 
rights law is relevant in practice, because 
the EFTA Court has held that the  
provisions of the EEA Agreement are  
to be interpreted in the light of 
fundamental rights.3
1 C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department ECLI:EU:C:2011:865.
2  E.g. C-426/11, Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd. ECLI:EU:C:2013:521; C-13/94, P v S and 
Cornwall County Council ECLI:EU:C:1996:170.
3  E-12/10 ESA v Iceland [2011] EFTA Ct. Rep. 117, para.60 ; E-2/03, Ákæruvaldið v Ásgeir Logi Ásgeirsson et 
al. [2003] EFTA Ct. Rep. 18, para. 23.
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4.   The European Convention on Human 
Rights and British relations with the 
Strasbourg Court
In terms of the EUCFR, then, the panel 
were agreed that it has become a 
prominent instrument with an important 
role, although there was disagreement 
both as to the necessity of the Charter 
in practice and as to its likely future in 
relation to domestic law in the event 
of Brexit. As to the specific question of 
the implications of a possible Brexit for 
fundamental rights protection in the UK, 
however, the discussion focused more upon 
the ECHR and on British relations with the 
European Court of Human Rights.
These relations have, it was suggested, 
been especially strained in recent years 
by the prisoner voting issue and the UK’s 
failure to comply effectively with the 
judgment of the European Court of  
Human Rights on the matter.4 There are 
internal and external dimensions to this.  
In terms of the internal aspect, Alice 
Donald described the prisoner voting issue 
as having become “so toxic as to be unable 
to be handled by any party”. Ed Bates 
pointed out that the non-compliance with 
the judgment is despite the establishment 
of a Parliamentary Joint Committee 
which ultimately supported a change in 
domestic law in this area; Dominic Grieve, 
meanwhile, drew attention to the lack 
of pressure that was put on the then-
Coalition government when the issue 
was debated in Parliament. Much of the 
panel discussion, however, focused on 
the external aspect: on relations between 
Britain and the European Court of Human 
Rights over the prisoner voting matter. 
Dominic Grieve sensed “a slight measure 
of embarrassment about the original 
judgment” on the part of the Court – a 
judgment which, he added, represented 
“a high point of activism”. He suggested 
that against a backdrop of fears of 
straining relations between Britain and the 
Strasbourg Court further, the Committee 
of Ministers (the body charged with 
supervising the execution of judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights) 
is also, by now, “soft-pedalling because 
it sees the dangers that would come 
from forcing the issue”. Piers Gardner, 
on the other hand, offered a different 
interpretation of the situation. He argued 
that in fact, for the Committee of Ministers 
there is simply “no point in talking to 
the UK delegation, because they are 
completely stymied as to their voice” and 
are now less well-positioned to criticise 
other jurisdictions (such as Russia, where 
a directly comparable situation to the 
British prisoner voting has arisen5) in the 
light of the UK’s non-compliance with 
the judgment issued against it. On this 
analysis, what is at stake in instances of 
non-compliance or deferred compliance – 
be it with respect to prisoner voting or, as 
Brian Gormally raised, the Northern Irish 
group of cases as to unresolved deaths 
during the conflict and the investigative 
obligation under the Convention6 – is also 
the reputation of the UK as an upholder 
and promoter of fundamental rights.  
This also, Gardner argued, entails 
implications for the protection of 
fundamental rights in Europe and at  
the international level more generally, 
because the UK carries significant  
influence in this sphere.
4 Appl. No. 74025/01, Hirst v UK (No. 2) (2005).
5 Appls. Nos. 11157/04 and 15162/05, Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia (2013) and its aftermath in Russia.
6 Appl. No. 28883/95, McKerr v UK (2001).
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This point was further emphasised by 
Alice Donald, who stated that the other 
Council of Europe States – and particularly 
those with high levels of non-compliance 
with judgments of the European Court 
of Human Rights – “are watching what 
is happening in the UK”, such that even 
talk of withdrawal from the ECHR “has 
been and will be immensely damaging as 
long as it continues”. Donald decried, in 
particular, “the very intemperate rhetoric 
and discourse which has surrounded the 
Convention in recent years”, not least in 
media portrayal. And yet, she added, the 
issue should not be distorted; although 
such cases as the prisoner voting issue 
acquire political salience and command 
media attention, the UK has, in general, 
a very strong record in complying with 
judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights, and in statistical fact,  
“a very healthy functional relationship” 
obtains between Britain and the 
Strasbourg Court. This reality is obscured 
and problematized by the contrary 
portrayal of the relationship by the media, 
and, moreover, the issue is coupled with 
the Brexit debate in public and media 
perception more generally.
This is not least, Diana Wallis added, 
because many hold the view that ‘Europe’ 
– with no distinction between the 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts – is  
“a source of rights”. And so although, she 
argued, support for non-domestic rights 
may be fragile as a result of the prisoner 
voting issue, there is still a strong sense 
that ‘Europe’ is “a port of last resort” 
in some way, such that taking away the 
rights ‘it’ protects would provoke outrage. 
Moreover, Drew Smith added, such talk 
of taking away ECHR rights is inherently 
problematic in itself, not least due to 
devolution and the interaction between 
the Scotland Act and the Human Rights 
Act (which gives further effect to the 
rights and freedoms set out in the ECHR 
in domestic law). The Scottish Parliament 
would have to consent to repeal of the 
Human Rights Act, and “there is no 
prospect whatsoever” of that.
As to The European Convention 
on Human Rights and British 
relations with the Strasbourg 
Court, strains in recent years 
due to the prisoner voting  
issue make it “so toxic as to  
be unable to be handled by  
any party”.
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5.  The question of the British Bill of Rights
With the bulk of the debate about the 
ECHR and British relations with the 
Strasbourg Court centring on concerns 
relating to the UK’s reputation and 
influence in this sphere, the discussion 
moved on to the related question of 
the British Bill of Rights. Adam Wagner 
briefly outlined for the panel a history 
of the commitment of the Conservative 
government to such a Bill. He emphasised 
in particular the role of the earlier Bill 
of Rights Commission, and the support 
of the majority of that Commission for a 
Bill of Rights partly on the grounds that 
it would (so it was perceived) “[restore] 
the reputation of human rights in the 
UK”. Referring to a piece which was later 
written by Helena Kennedy and Philippe 
Sands,7 Wagner noted a further possible 
underlying narrative which may have 
been formative in the workings of the 
Commission: an apparent desire, on the 
part of some of its members, for the UK 
to withdraw from the ECHR. He traced the 
influence of this notion to the Grayling 
paper of 2014, in which it was proposed, 
inter alia, that judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights would be advisory 
rather than binding, with the proviso that 
if the Strasbourg Court disagreed with 
this approach, then the UK would leave 
the ECHR. In this, Wagner argued, the 
Strasbourg Court was essentially being ‘set 
up’. How could it not disagree with such 
an approach, and, furthermore, with the 
reduced and likely ECHR non-compliant 
standards that were being proposed for  
a British Bill of Rights?
The Bill of Rights that was then drafted, 
Wagner stated, was “a radical recasting 
of the European Convention rights” with, 
essentially, fewer rights for fewer people 
and an overall undermining of rights 
protection. Following the General Election 
of 2015, in which the Conservatives won 
only by a very narrow majority (with the 
radical draft of the Bill of Rights being 
consequently politically unfeasible), Michael 
Gove, as the Lord Chancellor, finds himself 
in a difficult situation. On the one hand, the 
Conservative party manifesto is committed 
to a British Bill of Rights and a decoupling 
from the European Court of Human Rights. 
On the other hand, Ministers need to 
avoid “a collision path with Strasbourg”. 
This, Wagner argued, is quite simply “an 
unwinnable political fight”. According 
to Dominic Grieve, it is, moreover an 
increasingly failing one. Grieve argued that 
the political vision which developed during 
the autumn of 2015, in which the Bill of 
Rights was transformed into a Bill intended 
to curb the activities of both the Strasbourg 
and Luxembourg Courts, was never a 
clear nor an effective proposal. Its only 
consequence, he suggested, has been that 
the Bill itself has, for now, “disappeared off 
the radar screen”, likely to resurface only 
after the referendum.
Yet when the Bill of Rights does eventually 
resurface, there are, evidently, a number 
of questions as to its desirability, necessity, 
and content, and against the broader 
background of the history and current 
position of the Bill, the panel discussed 
these in detail. The British Bill of Rights 
was largely cast in negative terms. It was 
7 P. Sands and H. Kennedy, ‘In Defence of Rights’ (2013) London Review of Books 35(1), 19-22.
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generally characterised, in Dominic Grieve’s 
term, as an “ECHR-minus” entailing a 
reduced level of fundamental rights 
protection in the UK. Of course, it would be 
a different debate entirely, Brian Gormally 
pointed out, if the Bill of Rights project were 
to enhance rights protection or develop 
particular areas of weakness in the ECHR 
(namely pertaining to social and economic 
rights):“if you ever heard anything of that 
nature, then you could say that British 
exceptionalism might be a progressive 
thing”! But in reality, the project, as Angela 
Patrick put it, was one of “circumscribing 
ECHR rights”. And this, located in a 
broader context of negative signalling 
from the government about the EU and 
ECHR which leans towards “retrenchment 
from international cooperation” is, Patrick 
argued, inherently problematic.
There was, then, something of a consensus 
among participants as to the problematic 
quality of the political vision of the British 
Bill of Rights as it stands. But on the 
question of the very notion of a British 
Bill of Rights more generally, there was 
notable disagreement. Geoffrey Robertson, 
in particular, advocated retention and 
enhancement of the current multi-layered 
and interlinked system of fundamental 
rights protection: “I’m one who believes 
the more human rights, the merrier. And I 
don’t see why we can’t have it all: why we 
can’t have the Charter, the British Bill of 
Rights, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights.” His principal argument in 
favour of a British Bill of Rights was that the 
British public “have no sense of ownership” 
of the ECHR, whereas a British Bill could 
set out “rights that are dear to us”, namely 
the right to trial by jury. So, “for our own 
sense of history and pride”, and given that 
other European countries have their own 
Bills of Rights, he advocated the creation 
of a British Bill of Rights and the retention 
of the ECHR “as a back-stop”. Robertson 
emphasised, however, the importance of 
this back-stop, which, he argued, was not 
least due to how the ECHR has enhanced 
fundamental rights protection domestically 
(“we’d still be caning children in schools if 
it wasn’t for Strasbourg...”) and because of 
the check it places on “countries that would 
never be allowed into Europe” – a check 
which would be weakened if the UK, with 
all its influence, were to withdraw from  
the ECHR.
IMAGE SEARCH
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For other participants, however, it is 
precisely these appeals to “ownership”  
and “our own sense of history and pride” 
that create a further issue with respect  
to the notion of a British Bill of Rights.  
This is because, as Drew Smith, Jackie 
Jones, and Simon Hoffman alluded to, 
there are different justice systems, public 
attitudes, and traditions within Britain 
today, and there is no one coherent  
set of ‘British values’ that could be  
drawn on in formulating a Bill of Rights.  
This, it was indicated, is a fundamental 
issue which has to be addressed before 
even contemplating how such a Bill  
would work in practice. 
On that latter aspect, as to how a British 
Bill of Rights might work, Gavin Phillipson 
picked up on two points in particular: 
Geoffrey Robertson’s argument in favour 
of a British Bill of Rights with the retention 
of the ECHR as “a back-stop” and a point 
made by Angela Patrick concerning the 
perceived undermining of rights protection 
brought about by UK-specific narratives 
of repatriation of laws and rights and her 
scepticism as to such a ‘British’ take on 
rights. Phillipson argued that although 
the bad version of any local variant on 
rights would be that they become a purely 
internal matter, defined by national 
interest, there is also “a more benevolent 
version”. On this model, “there is a 
minimum of international agreement and 
there is reasonable scope for local colour on 
rights at the national level”. Such a model, 
Phillipson pointed out, obtains in a number 
of other countries, many of which “would 
find it very puzzling having an international 
court that in quite some detail dictates to 
them the content of fundamental rights” as 
does the European Court of Human Rights 
in relation to the UK. 
This special – unusual – quality of the 
European system needs to be recognised, 
Phillipson suggested, because it is 
consequently “not unreasonable in 
principle to object to some extent” and 
“to say actually we would like a little 
more national determination with these 
matters”. And yet, he noted, there is a 
fundamental question as to how such 
a Bill of Rights would operate, and 
whether it would simply amount to a 
rebranding of the Human Rights Act – 
albeit a rebranding which could contain 
rhetorically crafted statements regarding 
parliamentary sovereignty or the domestic 
superiority of the UK Supreme Court. 
Whilst Geoffrey Robertson and Adam 
Wagner argued that in theory, a Bill of 
Rights could contribute to public education 
and culture (“a real fantastic project 
of getting people involved, using our 
democratic ideals to come up with a truly...
British Bill of Rights”, suggested Wagner), 
the general concern was that in practice, 
a Bill of Rights would speak primarily to 
politicians, presenting rights as disposable, 
dispensable and diminished. 
There is no coherent set  
of British values to formulate 
a British Bill of Rights.
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For some participants in the hearing, both 
the challenge posed to fundamental rights 
protection in the UK by the very prospect – 
let alone the realisation – of the British Bill 
of Rights and the holding of a referendum 
over continuing EU membership are  
rooted in the same source and attitude:  
a turn inwards, towards the repatriation  
of laws and rights. This is an attitude 
towards “external oversight” which is  
in itself, Brian Gormally suggested, 
“inimical to human rights protection”. 
Angela Patrick developed this point 
further, expressing concern about the 
nature and implications of negative 
signalling from the government, and 
arguing that it runs counter to the ethos 
of the concept of post-war sovereignty, 
whereby some sovereignty is given up for 
the greater good. Alice Donald emphasised 
not only that the domestic debate is 
somewhat narrow in focus given that the 
problems facing Europe (such as terrorism 
and the refugee crisis) are entirely cross-
border in nature, but also that it would 
be very much worth pushing the debate 
further and thinking about the meaning of 
democracy and citizenship. Although this 
aspect of the debate has been stunted by 
the “rather tired” domestic framing of the 
discussion in terms of the English tradition 
of parliamentary sovereignty, there is a 
very rich discussion, she argued, that is 
to be had not only about citizenship but 
“about how belonging to a supranational 
human rights regime actually then in  
turn reinforces democracy at the  
domestic level”.
Not all participants agreed either with 
this framing of the UK narrative or with 
the notion of transnational democracy 
presented. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, 
in particular, cast the question of Brexit 
more broadly in terms of “the right 
to democratic government”. Whilst 
supporting the general principle of “an 
international long-stop on rights”, he 
suggested that the central issue at stake 
is that of “who judges” and “who has 
the last say”, and argued that democracy 
is overly-complicated and undermined 
by “the quasi-sovereignty or shared 
sovereignty system” at present. Brexit, 
he indicated, would secure a directly 
responsible and accountable government, 
and would realise an entirely domestic 
vision of democracy.
Mary Honeyball, meanwhile argued that 
a great deal would be lost by the UK in 
the event of Brexit; the very debate about 
Brexit is in itself “extraordinary”, she 
argued, not least given the long history 
of the UK in the EU and the nature of 
globalisation. Honeyball further suggested 
that one of the primary benefits of pooling 
sovereignty and “having external reference 
points to issues in general but particularly 
to human rights issues” in the context of 
the British parliamentary system is the 
power that the elected government has. 
External reference points, she suggested, 
constitute a check on this power, and two 
areas where the workings of this European 
influence have been seen are workers’ 
rights and equality measures (particularly 
in terms of women’s rights). It is, therefore, 
a question of where Britain wants to be. 
5.  UK narratives and the choice of  
reference points
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Her argument would be “that we should 
stay within the European Union, that we 
should stay within the set-up of human 
rights, because that gives guarantees, and 
external reference points and external 
ports in a way that I don’t think we could 
match within this country”.
Diana Wallis further developed this point 
on the choice facing Britain as to where it 
wants to be, adding that there needs to be 
consideration of the role that the UK has 
played in creating “an international or  
a European space for law and rights”.  
The right to free movement, which the  
EU has advocated that people take up, has 
been actively exercised by British people. 
It is a problematic and uncomfortable 
position to “suddenly package law 
back into its national box”. It is not 
only a question of noting the value of 
the external reference point, but also 
acknowledging that this has been fully 
engaged with and depended upon; “our 
lives are lived on the basis that we can 
move around and we can live, study and 
work elsewhere”. The issue, Wallis argued, 
is that the UK lacks a legal framework 
which suits this common European space, 
and rather than pushing towards a 
repatriation of laws and rights, we  
should focus on that. 
Whilst there was something of a consensus, 
then, that the issue of reference points 
is both necessary and central, there was 
greater disagreement as to where to locate 
the reference point itself. Concern was 
expressed on both sides of the debate, 
and the dominant narrative that emerged 
across the panel was one of an urgent 
need to think and rethink very carefully 
the positions that are being advocated and 
the UK narratives either emerging or are 
being inferred from various government 
actions or attitudes. Those arguing in 
favour of Brexit and the repatriation 
of laws and rights were urged to be 
aware of the damaging message this 
could send out with respect to Britain’s 
commitment to international cooperation 
and international standards of rights 
protection. Those advocating that Britain 
remain within the EU were urged to think 
of the bureaucratic credentials of the EU 
and the purportedly questionable necessity 
of the Charter. Those harbouring the view 
that Brexit would entail liberation from 
the Charter were urged to be mindful of  
its likely legacy effect in domestic law. 
And, finally, those arguing in favour of 
a British Bill of Rights were advised to 
consider the implications of its amounting 
to an “ECHR-minus”.
The urgent need is to rethink 
very carefully the positions 
advocated and the UK 
narratives emerging.
15LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe |
What this hearing of the LSE Commission 
on the Future of Britain in Europe 
ultimately revealed was that the nature 
of the interlinked regimes of fundamental 
rights protection in the UK makes the 
question ‘What would Brexit mean for the 
protection of fundamental rights in the 
UK?’ especially difficult to answer. This is 
not least due to the difficulty of isolating 
this question from the context of changes 
and developments in fundamental rights 
protection in the UK more generally, 
including, for example, debates pertaining 
to British relations with the European 
Court of Human Rights and the prospect 
of a British Bill of Rights. The panel 
indicated that whilst Brexit would reduce 
the level of fundamental rights protection 
in the UK, the implications of a possible 
Brexit in this sphere would also be largely 
dependent also on a number of variables, 
namely as to what would happen to the 
EUCFR in relation to domestic law, what 
would happen in relation to the ECHR and 
to British relations with the Strasbourg 
Court more generally, and what would 
happen to the British Bill of Rights and 
the commitment of the Conservative 
government to the realisation of this. 
For now, it seems, the principal effect 
of even the very prospect of Brexit for 
fundamental rights protection in the 
UK is that it changes the nature of the 
debate. Whether this change is conceived 
of in terms of challenging current 
reference points or raising the possibility 
of alternative reference points, it sets 
the stage for various and competing 
narratives which may, or may not be, 
ultimately conducive to fundamental 
rights protection in the UK. It is over these 
narratives, the panel urged, that there 
needs to be caution. Ultimately, the panel 
agreed, the implications of both Brexit 
and broader shifts in fundamental rights 
protection in the UK depend on what we 
are trying to achieve: internal or external 
reference points. And that, in turn, is not 
a question limited to that of the future of 
fundamental rights. It is a question of the 
collective vision of national and European 
society upon which the debate over 
fundamental rights merely casts light.
7. Conclusion
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